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Models dealing with cross-border acquisitions versus greenfield investment usually assume that the
entry of a foreign firm into a market has effects on the outputs of all domestic firms in that market,
but exit or entry of local firms is not considered. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the acquisition
versus greenfield versus exporting question under fixed versus free entry assumptions for local firms.
Our finding is that greenfield entry and exporting options are more attractive relative to acquisition
when the local market structure adjusts to foreign entry through local entry or exit than when it is fixed.
The entering foreign firm may do better or worse under free entry versus a fixed market structure depending
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Analyses of cross-border acquisitions versus greenﬁeld investments are moti-
vated by the relatively large volume of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in
total world FDI ﬂows. Even in developing countries, where we might expect
entry of foreign ﬁrms by greenﬁeld investments to dominate, about one-third
of FDI inﬂows were by M&A by the late 1990s. For the world as a whole, the
value of cross M&A activity was about four-ﬁfths of total FDI ﬂows (World
Investment Report 2000). Thus international trade and ﬁnance economists
have been keen to understand the factors driving the choice of entry mode by
foreign multinational ﬁrms. There have been a fair number of papers written
about cross-border acquisitions versus greenﬁeld investments, and some in-
clude a third option for a foreign ﬁrm such as exporting. These models vary
considerably in their structure and assumptions, presumably largely because
the modelers have diﬀerent underlying questions in mind.
Our approach to this question comes indirectly from what is known as the
strategic-trade-policy literature, a largely normative literature that consid-
ered the eﬀects of trade and industrial policy in an environment of increasing
returns to scale and imperfect competition. One thing that turned out to be
crucial in determining the sign as well as the magnitude of optimal policies
is whether or not there is free entry and exit of ﬁrms in response to the pol-
icy (Venables 1985, Horstmann and Markusen 1986, Markusen and Venables
1988).
In our reading of the literature on greenﬁeld versus acquisitions in the
international context, we have not seen a model which allows for the entry
or exit of domestic ﬁrms (other than the target of course) in response to the
entry of a foreign multinational into the country.1 Perhaps the closest dis-
cussion to ours is a short section in Navaretti and Venables (2004, chapter 3,
1For example, Bjorvatn (2004) discusses the choice of entry to a foreign market in
a simple Cournot setup, whereas M¨ uller (2007) does a similar exercise in a Hotelling
setup. For similar models using a ﬁxed market structure, see Eicher and Kang (2005)
and Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2004). Other models discuss international mergers as
a way to overcome information asymmetries (see Qiu and Zhou, 2006) or the possibility
of merger waves when ﬁrms diﬀer substantially across countries and industries (see Neary,
2007). Also these models do not consider entry or exit of non-target ﬁrms.
1written by Venables). They use a standard large-group monopolistic competi-
tion model and inquire as to the eﬀect of the entry of a foreign multinational,
either by switching from exports or by entirely new supply.2 In either case,
the entry can be by greenﬁeld or by M&A, though there is no deﬁnition and
no discussion about the acquisition process or price. Assume that the foreign
ﬁrm is “new”, not a switcher from exporting. A central case assumes that the
foreign multinational produces with the same marginal cost as local ﬁrms.
Thus if the foreign ﬁrm enters by “greenﬁeld” it will simply displace one do-
mestic ﬁrm in the monopolistic-competition equilibrium, and if it enters by
“M&A” it takes over one ﬁrm which leaves the proﬁts of the remaining ﬁrms
at zero. There is no observational diﬀerence between greenﬁeld and M&A:
in either case, ex post there is one foreign ﬁrm and (n − 1) domestic ﬁrms.
A similar equivalence occurs if entry is switching from exports. They do not
solve for an equilibrium under the assumption of a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms and
thus do not compare it to the free entry/exit case which is the principal focus
of our paper.3
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model which endogenizes mar-
ket entry of local ﬁrms and in which ﬁrms interact strategically.4 We build a
partial-equilibrium model of a single industry in a single host country, with
an outside foreign ﬁrm that is initially exporting to the country.5 There are
2Models of monopolistic competition and ﬁrm heterogeneity have identiﬁed which type
of ﬁrms chose which entry type; see Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). Nocke and Yeaple
(2007) show that the type of entry depends on the source of heterogeneity. If ﬁrms diﬀer
in their mobile capabilities, the most eﬃcient ﬁrms go for a greenﬁeld investment; if ﬁrms
diﬀer in their immobile capabilities, the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms acquire local ﬁrms. Our
analysis does not assume any heterogeneity across ﬁrms (except between the multinational
and the local ﬁrms), because we want to focus on exit or entry of local ﬁrms as a response
to a strategic investment of the multinational ﬁrm.
3Our comment here is not a criticism. Navaretti and Venables are not really interested
in greenﬁeld versus acquisition; their discussion on pages 67-68 is more of an aside and
not related to the broader focus of the chapter. A similar ex post equivalence of greenﬁeld
and acquisition occurs in the free-entry models in Markusen (2002).
4Haller (2009) considers the impact on a local duopolistic industry in which ﬁrms diﬀer
and can reduce costs by R&D.
5We consider a single multinational ﬁrm entering a market in which several local ﬁrms
are active. See Norb¨ ack and Persson (2007, 2008) for models in which several multinationals
potentially enter a market, and in which they may compete among each other for the
acquisition of a single domestic ﬁrm. Horn and Persson (2001) consider both international
2zero proﬁts earned by multiple host-country ﬁrms initially. Then the multi-
national is allowed to directly enter either by making a greenﬁeld investment
in a new plant, or by acquiring one local ﬁrm. This is analyzed both under
the assumption that the number of other host-country ﬁrms is held ﬁxed, or
that the number adjust such that zero-proﬁts are maintained. Acquisition is
modelled as a Nash bargaining game between the multinational and one ﬁrm,
but we include the special case where all of the bargaining weight goes to
the multinational (who makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers) so that the multina-
tional ﬁrm captures all of the surplus. The multinational’s outside option is
exporting and the local ﬁrm’s outside option is then (continued) zero proﬁts.
Entry of the foreign ﬁrm (switching from exporting) by acquisition has
the eﬀect of driving up the product price in the host country under the ﬁxed
market structure (import supply disappears), but drives down the price when
entering via greenﬁeld (there is one more ﬁrm, with a marginal cost less
than under exporting). Allowing the number of (zero-proﬁt) domestic ﬁrms
to adjust means that there will be entry under acquisition but exit under
greenﬁeld. Relative to the ﬁxed-market structure, free entry and exit make
acquisition less attractive relative to either greenﬁeld or to exporting.
The eﬀects of the alternative market-structure assumptions on the proﬁts
of the entering multinational are interesting. Use the ﬁxed assumption as a
benchmark and now introduce free entry and exit. If the ﬁrm chose green-
ﬁeld under the former or switches from exporting to greenﬁeld, its proﬁts
will increase with entry, whereas if it initially chose acquisition the situation
is a bit more complex. If the multinational continues to choose acquisition
or switches to exporting it must be worse oﬀ. But if it switches to greenﬁeld,
it can be either better or worse oﬀ: free entry reduces the proﬁts from ac-
quisition but increases the proﬁts from greenﬁeld. If that latter proﬁt level
“jumps over”acquisition proﬁts suﬃciently that greenﬁeld proﬁts are now
higher than the initial acquisition proﬁts, then the multinational is better
oﬀ.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the
and national mergers at the same time.
3general model and develops an important invariance result for an endoge-
nous market structure. Section 3 speciﬁes the model further and discusses
the foreign entry option both for a ﬁxed and an endogenous market struc-
ture. Section 4 presents the implications of parameter changes, and Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a single country, labeled Home. Within this country, local ﬁrms
do not export to other markets but serve their local market only. There is free
market entry, and local ﬁrms have to carry a ﬁxed cost of size F upon entry.
After they have entered the market, they produce with a constant marginal
cost c. Let n denote the number of local ﬁrms. Additionally, there is a foreign
ﬁrm denoted by the subscript 0. This ﬁrm is a multinational ﬁrm which is
already active in other markets and does not have to carry any entry cost.
We will not yet discuss the type of activity carried out by this ﬁrm, i.e.,
whether this ﬁrm will serve the market through an acquisition, a greenﬁeld
investment or by exports, but we will rather consider how a change in the
foreign ﬁrm’s activity level will aﬀect the Home market.
Preferences of consumers in Home can be represented by a quasi-linear
utility function which gives rise to an inverse demand function p(z) where
z denotes aggregate production for the Home market. Let xi denote the
individual output of a local ﬁrm, and x0 is the output of the foreign ﬁrm. As
common in Cournot models of this type, we assume strategic substitutability
in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) such that p′(z) +
p′′(z)x < 0,∀x ∈]0,z]. Aggregate production is determined by
z − nxi = x0. (1)
The local ﬁrm behavior is given by the ﬁrst order condition
p
′(z)xi + p − c = 0. (2)
Ignoring the integer constraint allows us to determine the number of local
ﬁrms entering the market by the zero proﬁt condition
4[p(z) − c]xi = F. (3)
We now consider how any change in the activity of the multinational ﬁrm
will change individual production levels, aggregate production and market
entry. For this purpose, we treat x0 as an exogenous variable and consider
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Expression (5) proves our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 If the market structure is endogenous, any change in the
foreign ﬁrm’s output level
1. does not change aggregate production,
2. does not change the size of active local ﬁrms,
3. but implies only market entry or exit.
Proposition 1 is a very strong result which demonstrates that the local in-
dustry will adjust to multinational activities only by market entry or market
exit. Furthermore, consumers are not aﬀected at all because aggregate sup-
ply stays constant. Proposition 1 is a very general result which holds true
for any multinational activities, including those we will consider in the next
section.6 Lemma 1 summarizes this implication for the diﬀerent modes of
multinational activities.
6St¨ ahler and Upmann (2008) develop a similar result for unilateral market entry regu-
lation in an integrated market.
5Lemma 1 If the market structure is endogenous, any acquisition, any green-
ﬁeld investment or any export will not change aggregate production and in-
dividual production levels of local ﬁrms but only the number of active local
ﬁrms.
This result is not inconsistent with empirical ﬁndings. The increase in x0
which we will endogenize in the following section may originate from trade
and/or investment liberalization.7 For example, Gu, Sawchuk and Whewell
(2003) show that the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement had no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on Canadian ﬁrm size but on ﬁrm turnover as measured by the exit rate
of manufacturing ﬁrms (see also Head and Ries, 1999). Hence, tariﬀ reduc-
tions and an increase in import competition did not change the scale of active
ﬁrms, but made some ﬁrms leave the market, as predicted by Proposition 1.
3 Acquisitions and greenﬁeld investment
with endogenous market structure
In this section, we employ a more speciﬁc model in order to discuss the
role of endogenous market structures on the type of market entry. Demand
in Home is given by p = a − bX, and c∗ denotes the marginal cost of the
foreign ﬁrm. In case of exports, the foreign ﬁrm has to carry a trade cost of
size t per unit of exports. If c∗ + t > c, the market share of an exporting
ﬁrm will be lower than that of a local ﬁrm. Furthermore, c∗ < c guarantees
that the foreign ﬁrm’s marginal costs are lower and it will have a higher
market share if it enters the market by a greenﬁeld investment. For future
convenience, we introduce γ ≡ c∗ +t−c, which is the diﬀerence in marginal
costs between an exporting and a local ﬁrm (and which can be negative). We
assume that γ <
√
bF which guarantees that at least exports are worthwhile.8
Furthermore, we assume that a − c >
√
bF; this condition guarantees that
the market is suﬃciently proﬁtable even if only local ﬁrms are active. π(Π)
will denote the proﬁt of the local (foreign) ﬁrm.
7In fact, it could be even the increase in combined output by several foreign ﬁrms.
8If
√
bF < γ, local entry cost is low and consequently the local market is crowded by
local ﬁrms such that the average cost of a local ﬁrm is less than c∗ + t.
6The setup of our analysis is as follows. Prior to possible foreign direct
investment, the foreign ﬁrm could only enter the domestic market via exports.
Potentially active local ﬁrms correctly anticipate the behavior of the foreign
ﬁrm and decide to enter or not to enter the market. Correctly anticipating
output behavior, local ﬁrms enter the domestic market until the proﬁt of
each local ﬁrm is equal to zero. We label this scenario as the trade regime
and use it as the benchmark for our analysis. Each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts
which gives rise to the ﬁrst-order conditions of a local ﬁrm and an export
ﬁrm, respectively:
p − c + p
′x = 0, p − c
∗ − t + p
′x
∗ = 0. (6)
x(x∗) denotes the output of a local (export) ﬁrm. Since local ﬁrms are sym-
metric, aggregate output X is equal to nx+x∗. Using symmetry and solving
for outputs yields the maximized proﬁts
πT =
(a − c + γ)2
b(n + 2)2 − F, ΠT =
(a − nγ − (c∗ + t))2
b(n + 2)2 . (7)
The trade regime is denoted by the subscript T. Local ﬁrms will enter the
market until their proﬁts are equal to zero which allows us to determine the
equilibrium number of local ﬁrms:
nT =




The foreign ﬁrm correctly anticipates the behavior of local rivals both in
terms of their number and their outputs. Using (8) for ΠT in (7) determines







Now assume that the foreign ﬁrm is also allowed to acquire a local ﬁrm
or to make a greenﬁeld investment. We assume that acquiring a local ﬁrm
implies using its technology whereas a greenﬁeld investment implies that
7the foreign ﬁrm transfers its technology to the host country.9 Hence, an ac-
quired ﬁrm will continue to be run with marginal costs of size c, but a green-
ﬁeld investment will enable the foreign ﬁrm to serve the domestic market by
marginal costs of c∗.
We know from Proposition 1 that aggregate output will not change with
the activity level of the foreign ﬁrm when market structure is endogenous.
From our speciﬁc assumptions in this section, we thus know that aggregate








in equilibrium under free entry, irrespective of the mode of entry of the multi-
national. Note that aggregate output decreases with F and c, but increases
with b.
We will now consider the incentives to export, to acquire a ﬁrm or to make
a greenﬁeld investment under two diﬀerent assumptions about the market
structures. In the short run, local ﬁrms may not be able to enter or leave
the market after foreign direct investment has become possible. In this case,
the number of active local ﬁrms is ﬁxed to the endogenously derived number
of ﬁrms under the trade regime. In the long run, however, local ﬁrms will
leave (enter) the market if proﬁts are negative (positive), and in that case
the number of active local ﬁrms is determined such that local proﬁts are
equal to zero. The sequence of moves is given by Table 1.10
3.1 Greenﬁeld investment
In the case of a greenﬁeld investment, the foreign ﬁrm will produce by a lower
marginal cost but has to carry a ﬁxed cost of size G. We can see from the
ﬁrst-order conditions for local ﬁrms and the foreign ﬁrm, i.e.,
p − c + p
′x = 0, p − c
∗ + p
′x
∗ = 0, (11)
9Our results would not change substantially if we allowed the acquired ﬁrm to operate
with lower marginal costs.
10Note that we allow the foreign ﬁrm only to export if sales negotiations fail. Allowing
greenﬁeld as an outside option would require to allow the local ﬁrm to pay the foreign ﬁrm
as to avoid market entry via greenﬁeld. See the discussion in subsection 3.2.
8Table 1: Game structure of the model incorporating FDI
Stage I:
Foreign ﬁrm decides to make a greenﬁeld investment or
to enter sales negotiations with a local ﬁrm or
to export.
Stage II:
In case of sales negotiations, the local target ﬁrm and the
foreign ﬁrm bargain over the acquisition price.
If negotiations fail, the foreign ﬁrm may export to Home.
Stage IIa: (only for endogenous market structures)
Local ﬁrms (except the possibly acquired ﬁrm) decide simultaneously
to enter or to leave the market.
Stage III:
All active ﬁrms decide simultaneously
on their output levels.
that the foreign ﬁrm is now more aggressive in the local market (x∗ now
denotes the output of the multinational ﬁrm). For a ﬁxed market structure,
the output of the multinational ﬁrm will increase and the output of all local
ﬁrms will decline:
x =




a − (n + 1)c∗ + nc
b(n + 2)
. (12)
However, aggregate output will unambiguously increase if no entry and exit
occurs because local ﬁrms will produce less if and only if the price has de-
clined. The foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts from greenﬁeld are equal to
Π =
(a − (n + 1)c∗ + nc)2
b(n + 2)2 − G. (13)
If no entry or exit of local ﬁrms occurs, the number of active ﬁrms is equal




bF + (c − c∗)(a − c −
√
bF + γ))2
b(a − c + γ)2 − G. (14)
The bar denotes the ﬁxed market structure.
9What will happen if local ﬁrms are allowed to enter or leave the mar-
ket? The increase in aggregate output and the decline in individual output
will unambiguously decrease proﬁts of local ﬁrms in case of a ﬁxed market
structure. Given that their proﬁts have been equal to zero under the trade
regime, greenﬁeld investment will induce market exit of some local ﬁrms. If
the foreign ﬁrm enters via greenﬁeld, the proﬁt of each local ﬁrm is equal to
πG =
(a − 2c + c∗)2
b(n + 2)
− F, (15)
which is zero in equilibrium for an endogenous market structure. From (15),
we can determine the number of local ﬁrms
nG =




The foreign ﬁrm will correctly anticipate that the number of active local ﬁrms









The star denotes the endogenous market structure. Comparing (14) and (17)
shows that Π∗
G > ¯ ΠG because the exit of local ﬁrms increases foreign proﬁts.
Our results are summarized by
Proposition 2 For a ﬁxed market structure, greenﬁeld investment implies
an increase in aggregate output and a decrease in both output and proﬁt of
each local ﬁrm. If the market structure is endogenous, greenﬁeld investment
implies market exit, and greenﬁeld proﬁts are larger for the multinational
compared to a ﬁxed market structure.
3.2 Acquisition
In case of a ﬁxed market structure, any acquisition will imply that two
formely independent ﬁrms will merge in a new entity such that, ceteris
paribus, the number of all active ﬁrms goes down by one. An acquisition
10may warrant a ﬁxed cost of size A with A ≥ 0.11 Let us consider an acquisi-
tion as a process after which the foreign ﬁrm becomes a local ﬁrm so that n is
now the number of ﬁrms including the new entity formed by the foreign and
a local ﬁrm. If an acquisition takes place, outputs and net operating proﬁts






b(n + 1)2. (18)
At the beginning of the game or “period”, we assume that the foreign ﬁrm
must choose among exporting, greenﬁeld, or an attempt to acquire a domes-
tic ﬁrm. If the foreign ﬁrm chooses to attempt an acquisition and it fails, we
assume that it reverts to exporting and that it cannot choose greenﬁeld at
that point. In other words, we rule out the possibility that the foreign ﬁrm
can threaten greenﬁeld in a negotiation. Allowing for this adds some messy
complications without changing our basic story.12 As for the acquisition price,
we assume that both parties enter a negotiation process the outcome of which
can be modelled as a Nash bargaining process. In order to allow for asym-
metric bargaining power, we assume that the Nash product, denoted by Ω,
is equal to
Ω = (M − q − A − ΠT)
αq
(1−α), (19)
where M denotes the merger proﬁts without ﬁxed cost, and q is the acqui-
sition price. The parameter α,α ∈ [0,1], gives the bargaining power of the
11For example, G¨ org (2000) ﬁnds that an acquisition warrants some product and process
adaptation costs.
12In order to facilitate an easy comparison of the three options under both no and free
entry, we calibrate the model initially such that domestic ﬁrms just break even. The prob-
lem with allowing the foreign ﬁrm to threaten greenﬁeld if negotiations are not successful
is that, with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, this implies negative proﬁts for all existing domestic
ﬁrms including the target as the outside option if negotiations fail. So the local target ﬁrm
even has an incentive to compensate the foreign ﬁrm for not doing a greenﬁeld investment.
Then you may ask why a local ﬁrm would want to start negotiating with the foreign ﬁrm
if it would be better oﬀ if any other local ﬁrm did that. While intriguing, this does that
seem to enrich our basic story. If we restrict the foreign ﬁrm to reverting to exporting as its
outside option, then a failed negotiation leaves the domestic ﬁrms continuing to earn zero
proﬁts under both no entry and free entry, thus facilitating an easy and clear comparison
between the two entry assumptions.
11foreign ﬁrm. The outside option for the foreign ﬁrm is to continue serving the
market by exports (which yields proﬁts ΠT), whereas the local ﬁrm’s outside
option is to compete against all other local ﬁrms and the foreign exporting
ﬁrm which yields zero proﬁts both under a ﬁxed and an endogenous market
structure. The merger is proﬁtable if M > A+ΠT. According to the Nash bar-
gaining solution, the acquisition price q will be equal to (1−α)(M −A−ΠT)
so foreign acquisition proﬁts will be equal to
ΠA = α(M − A) + (1 − α)ΠT. (20)
This proﬁt increases linearly with M. In case of a ﬁxed market structure,
local ﬁrms do not enter or leave the market and n is equal to nT. In this
case, merger proﬁts and foreign proﬁts are respectively equal to
¯ M =
(a − c)2F
(a − c −
√
bF + γ)2, (21)
¯ ΠA = α
µ
(a − c)2F
(a − c −
√
bF + γ)2 − A
¶





Why does ¯ M decline with t via γ? A large trade cost implies a large number
of local ﬁrms in the trade regime, so the foreign ﬁrm will buy a small-sized
ﬁrm which is less attractive. For a ﬁxed market structure, the acquisition of
a local ﬁrm will decrease aggregate output and thus the price in the Home
market increases. Both eﬀects will unambiguously increase proﬁts of local
ﬁrms, and since each local ﬁrm made zero proﬁts before, an acquisition will
induce market entry.13 In case of an endogenous market structure, the number






From (22), it follows that merger proﬁts are equal to the entry cost of a local
ﬁrm if the market structure is determined endogenously. With M∗ = F, the
13This eﬀect is well known as the merger paradox; see e.g. Perry and Porter (1985),
Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983). It implies that outsiders may beneﬁt more than the
merging ﬁrms.
12foreign acquisition proﬁts read
Π
∗








bF > γ, merger proﬁts and hence also foreign acquisition proﬁts
are lower compared to a ﬁxed market structure, i.e., ¯ M > M∗ (cf. (21) and
(23)). These results are summarized by
Proposition 3 For a ﬁxed market structure, an acquisition implies an de-
crease in aggregate output and an increase in both output and proﬁt of each
local ﬁrm. If the market structure is endogenous, an acquisition implies mar-
ket entry, and acquisition proﬁts are smaller for the multinational compared
to a ﬁxed market structure.
When comparing the acquisition option with trade, we arrive at a clear result.
Lemma 2 If A = 0 and γ > 0, an acquisition will always dominate trade.
Proof: For the case of an endogenous market structure Π∗
A = αF+(1−α)ΠT >
ΠT = (
√
bF − γ)2/b ⇔ bF > (
√
bF − γ)2 ⇔ γ > 0 if A = 0. Furthermore,
¯ M > M∗ so that the acquisition is even more proﬁtable in the case of a ﬁxed
market structure. ¤
The reason is straightforward: with no ﬁxed cost of an acquisition, the
foreign ﬁrm is able to take over a local ﬁrm very cheaply, as this ﬁrm is making
zero proﬁts under the trade regime anyway. Furthermore, γ > 0 implies that
local production by an acquired ﬁrm is less costly than exporting.
4 Discussion
In this section, we will illustrate our results graphically, and we will discuss
how parameter changes will aﬀect the relative proﬁtabilities of our FDI op-
tion with and without endogenous market structures. There are quite a few
parameters in our model, and we will choose two important ones to illustrate
some of our results. Figures 1 - 5 plot equilibrium regimes with G (green-
ﬁeld ﬁxed costs) on the vertical axis and t (exporting trade costs) on the
13horizontal axis. These ﬁgures are from numerical simulations over a grid of
values to give an idea about scale, but all of the qualitative eﬀects shown in
the ﬁgures are valid independently of the speciﬁc values of other parameters
held constant. At each point in the Figures, the number of domestic ﬁrms is
set endogenously to give them zero proﬁts under the exporting regime. This
number is then held ﬁxed in Figures 1 and 4, while it is allowed to adjust in
Figures 2 and 5 if the foreign ﬁrm chooses an option other than exporting.
Figures 1 - 3 use the bargaining parameter α = 0.5, while Figures 4 - 5
use α = 1. The latter is included because it is plausible to suppose that
the foreign ﬁrm might be able to make a series of all-or-nothing oﬀers until
someone accepts, giving all rents to the foreign ﬁrm. As should be clear from
(20) and (23), this is equivalent to setting α = 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Consider Figure 1 and a middle level of G (e.g., 0.75 in the Figure). At
very low trade costs, the foreign ﬁrm chooses exporting. As trade costs rise,
at some point the ﬁrm switches to acquisition. This level of trade costs is
independent of G as shown in the Figure (see (21)). As trade costs con-
tinue to rise, this erodes the foreign ﬁrms proﬁts in the acquisition game,
because the ﬁrm’s outside option becomes poorer. Thus at some higher level
of trade costs, the ﬁrm switches to greenﬁeld. The boundary between ac-
quisition and greenﬁeld is upward sloping because an increase in t reduces
acquisition proﬁts as just noted and this must be matched by an increase
in G which reduces greenﬁeld proﬁts. The boundary between exporting and
greenﬁeld is positively sloped because an increase in t that reduces exporting
proﬁts must be matched by an increase in G which will reduce greenﬁeld
proﬁts.14
Insert Figure 2 about here
14The appendix proves that the behavior of the boundaries in the G–t–space holds in
general for an endogenous market structure. This behavior is also quite intuitive for a ﬁxed
market structure. Note, however, that changes in t also change the benchmark equilibrium
(trade regime).
14Now suppose that we permit entry or exit in response to the foreign ﬁrm’s
choices in Figure 1. How will this alter the ﬁrm’s choice is shown in Figure
2. Consider a point on the boundary between exporting and acquisition in
Figure 1. Acquisition will lead to local entry under free entry/exit as we have
shown, which leads to lower proﬁts under acquisition, and hence the foreign
ﬁrm will now strictly prefer exporting at the old boundary: the boundary
between exporting and acquisition shifts right as shown in Figure 2. Second,
consider a point on the boundary between exporting and greenﬁeld in Fig-
ure 1. Greenﬁeld will now lead to local exit when entry/exit is allowed and
so proﬁts improve under that option: the boundary between exporting and
acquisition shifts up as shown in Figure 2. Third, consider a point on the
boundary between acquisition and greenﬁeld in Figure 1. Allowing entry re-
duces the proﬁts from acquisition (local entry) and increases the proﬁts from
greenﬁeld (local exit) and so greenﬁeld becomes strictly preferred and the
boundary between acquisition and greenﬁeld shifts up as shown in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 shows the change in the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts when entry/exit
are allowed relative to holding the number of local ﬁrms ﬁxed. Many of the
results have already been touched on: there is no change if the foreign ﬁrm
chose exports before and after the entry/exit allowed (region 1) because of
the calibration procedure; proﬁts fall if the ﬁrm switches from acquisition
to exports after entry/exit (region 2) or chooses acquisition before and after
entry/exit (region 3); proﬁts increase if the foreign ﬁrm switches to greenﬁeld
from exporting (region 4) or chooses greenﬁeld before and after entry/exit
(region 5).
The more complex region is the one in which the ﬁrm chooses acquisition
initially and then switches to greenﬁeld after entry/exit is permitted (region
6). This is composed of two sub-regions. Region 6.1 has an upper bound-
ary which is the new boundary between acquisition and greenﬁeld shown in
Figure 2. The introduction of entry/exit leads to entry under acquisition,
which is chosen initially, leading to a fall in proﬁts. The foreign ﬁrm switches
to greenﬁeld in region 6.1, recouping some of its loss but not enough to get
15back to its initial proﬁt level under no entry. Region 6.2 has a lower boundary
which is the initial boundary between acquisition and greenﬁeld in Figure 1.
While the ﬁrm (marginally) prefers acquisition in this region initially, the in-
troduction of entry/exit means that it can force exit and increase its proﬁts
by switching to greenﬁeld and its proﬁts increase from allowing entry/exit in
region 6.2.
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here
Figures 4 and 5 perform the same experiments as Figures 1 and 2, re-
spectively, but setting the foreign ﬁrm’s bargaining weight at one, α = 1.
As we just noted, this is equivalent to a situation where the ﬁrm can make
all-or-nothing oﬀers to competing domestic ﬁrms and hence can extract all
gains. The only boundary aﬀected is that between acquisition and greenﬁeld.
This boundary shifts down because the foreign ﬁrms proﬁts will be higher
with acquisition and unchanged under greenﬁeld in both the no entry and
free entry regimes. This boundary also ﬂattens out. The trade cost is irrele-
vant to the choice between acquisition and greenﬁeld under entry (Figure 5,
eq. (23)), and only of small, indirect importance under no entry/exit (Fig-
ure 4, eq. (21) – recall that t is an element of γ).15 The proﬁt eﬀects of entry
under α = 1 are qualitatively the same as in Figure 3, so we omit a ﬁgure
corresponding to Figure 3 for the α = 1 case.
Brieﬂy, we can note some comparative-statics results with respect to other
parameters. The following results refer to the borders in Figures 1 - 2. These
results can be shown analytically (see appendix). Consider ﬁrst an increase
in F, the ﬁxed cost for a local ﬁrm. An increase in F reduces the equilibrium
number of local ﬁrms in the benchmark (under foreign exporting), with those
ﬁrms being larger and having higher markups. Aggregate output is lower and
15Trade cost t only aﬀects acquisition proﬁts indirectly when the ﬁrm captures all rents,
and this is due to the calibration procedure. As noted earlier, as we move through the
parameter space in these ﬁgures, the initial number of local ﬁrms is adjusted to maintain
zero proﬁts. As t increases, so do the initial number of local ﬁrms that leaves proﬁts at
zero. Acquisition proﬁts fall the larger the (ﬁxed) number of local ﬁrms in the market
(eq. (21)) as do greenﬁeld proﬁts (eq. (14) – though this is not obvious by inspection),
but the latter fall by less in our simulations. Thus the acquisition - greenﬁeld boundary
in Figure 4 has a small positive slope.
16the equilibrium price is higher (see (10)). The largest impact is on greenﬁeld
proﬁts. Basically, the marginal cost advantage of switching from either ex-
porting or acquisition to greenﬁeld is ampliﬁed when the initial price (under
exporting) is higher, as is the case when F is higher.16
A decrease in b is an increase in the market size (essentially adding more
identical consumers, keeping the demand intercept on the p axis constant
and ﬂatting out the slope of the inverse demand curve). Aggregate output in-
creases, and this favors greenﬁeld relative to both acquisition and exporting.
A larger market gives the foreign ﬁrm a larger incentive to switch from higher
marginal cost exports or acquisition to lower marginal cost greenﬁeld. This
result is well known in the literature on horizontal investments under both
no and free/entry assumptions: the larger market makes it optimal to bear
a ﬁxed cost (G) to switch to a lower marginal-cost option (Markusen 2002).
It is interesting to note that this market-size eﬀect is general not present in
large-group monopolistic-competition models (Markusen and Venables 2000,
Navaretti and Venables 2004): with a constant markup, the number of ﬁrms
expands in strict proportion to market size, and hence does not create an
incentive to switch to foreign production.
Finally, consider a decrease in c, the marginal cost of host-country ﬁrms
and the marginal cost for the foreign ﬁrm under the acquisition option. A
lower c also increases aggregate output (see (10)), but improves the attrac-
tiveness of acquisition over either exporting or greenﬁeld and expands the
acquisition region in Figures 1 - 5 on both borders. Recall that we assumed
that c > c∗, otherwise the foreign ﬁrm would never choose greenﬁeld. We
could think of a fall in c as a convergence between the foreign country and
the local economy in terms of technical sophistication. An empirical impli-
cation of this is that is should be more common for entering ﬁrms to choose
acquisition when entering another advanced economy, and more common to
choose greenﬁeld in or exporting to a developing country. We are not aware of
empirical evidence on this point with respect to acquisition versus greenﬁeld,
but there is a good deal of evidence that foreign aﬃliates (either through
16See appendix for a general proof.
17greenﬁeld or acquisition) are chosen relative to exporting to more advance
economies (Markusen 2002, Navaretti and Venables 2004).
5 Concluding remarks
As noted in the introduction of the paper, there are many papers that are
at least partially interested in issues about greenﬁeld versus acquisition FDI
and those two choices versus exporting. These models generally diﬀer sub-
stantially from one another and are designed to address rather diﬀerent ques-
tions. We have long felt that one gap in the literature is that authors always
assume that the choice of entry mode by a foreign multinational does not
lead to any change in the number of local ﬁrms (other than of course an
acquired ﬁrm switching ownership). When we think about the importance of
the assumption of ﬁxed ﬁrm numbers versus free entry/exit in the strategic
trade-policy literature, we feel that this omission may be quite important.
In contrast to the existing M&A literature, we should also note that many if
not most of the mainstream theoretical literature on multinationals assume
free entry and exit of ﬁrms in response to any changes in the underlying
environment. Thus the theoretical M&A literature stands in sharp contrast
to much of the other theoretical literature on multinationals (Markusen and
Venables 2000, Markusen 2002, Navaretti and Venables 2004).
Our principal ﬁnding may seem rather obvious ex post: allowing adjust-
ment in the number of domestic ﬁrms following the entry of a foreign multi-
national (either a new supplier or a foreign ﬁrm switching from exporting)
leads to exit if the foreign ﬁrm chooses greenﬁeld and to entry if the foreign
ﬁrm chooses acquisition. Greenﬁeld becomes more attractive relative to either
exporting or to acquisition, and acquisition becomes less attractive relative
to exporting if entry/exit is allowed relative to the standard no entry/exit
assumption.
Other results are somewhat less obvious and we should bear in mind that
we are using a partial-equilibrium model. First, we show that under any de-
mand curvature, the adjustments of local ﬁrm numbers under free/entry exit
imply that the mode of entry by the multinational does not aﬀect aggregate
18output or the output per ﬁrm of the (adjusted number of) domestic ﬁrms.
Regardless of whichever of the three options the multinational chooses, do-
mestic ﬁrm numbers adjust so that total output and output per local ﬁrm is
constant. An implication of this is that the mode of entry does not have im-
portant welfare eﬀects on the local economy, except for some rent extraction
in the case of acquisition. While this may seem uninteresting, its importance
lies in its contrast to the no entry no exit mainstream literature, where the
choice of mode does have signiﬁcant local welfare consequences. Overall, our
ﬁnding suggest that free entry and exit of local ﬁrms in response to the entry
of a foreign ﬁrm has a signiﬁcant quantitative eﬀect.
Appendix
Result 1 proves that the boundaries between the foreign entry options as
displayed by the ﬁgures hold in general.
Result 1 If the market structure is endogenous,
1. a trade cost level ¯ t exists such that acquisition proﬁts and trade proﬁts
coincide,
2. a greenﬁeld investment (trade) is more proﬁtable for low (high) levels
of G if t ≤ ¯ t,
3. greenﬁeld investment (an acquisition) is more proﬁtable for low (high)
levels of G if t ≥ ¯ t.




















19Furthermore, ˆ G(t = 0) = 0 so that ˆ G is an increasing, concave function of
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Furthermore, ¯ G(t = 0) = α[(
√
bF + c − c∗)2/b − (F − A)] > 0, because
(
√
bF + c − c∗)2/b > F, so that ¯ G is an increasing, concave function of t,











which shows that the slope of ˆ G in the G–t–space is larger than the slope
of ¯ G for any identical t. Hence, if they cross in the G − t−space, they will
intersect only once. Let us denote the trade cost level where they intersect
by ¯ t. At this intersection, by deﬁnition Π∗
A = ΠT so that ΠT(¯ t) = F − A.
Since ΠT does not depend on G, Π∗
A < (>)ΠT if t < (>)¯ t. ¤
Result 2 demonstrates the change in foreign proﬁts with the local ﬁrm’s
ﬁxed cost F for an endogenous market structure.
Result 2 If the market structure is endogenous, an increase in F leads to
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Result 3 demonstrates the change in the boundaries with the parame-
ters F,b and c for an endogenous market structure. Note that an increase
in ˆ G( ¯ G) makes greenﬁeld relatively more attractive compared to trade (an
acquisition).
Result 3 If the market structure is endogenous, an increase in F increases
both ˆ G and ¯ G, and increase in b decreases both ˆ G and ¯ G, and an increase in
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